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Abstract—In the emerging Industrial IoT era, Machine-to-
Machine (M2M) communication technology is considered as a key
underlying technology for building Industrial IoT environments
where devices (e.g., sensors, actuators, gateways) are enabled to
exchange information with each other in an autonomous way
without human intervention. However, most of the existing M2M
protocols that can be also used in the Industrial IoT domain
provide security mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptography
resulting in high computational cost. As a consequence, the
resource-constrained IoT devices are not able to support them ap-
propriately and thus, many security issues arise for the Industrial
IoT environment. Therefore, lightweight security mechanisms are
required for M2M communications in Industrial IoT in order to
reach its full potential. As a step towards this direction, in this
paper, we propose a lightweight authentication mechanism, based
only on hash and XOR operations, for M2M communications
in Industrial IoT environment. The proposed mechanism is
characterized by low computational cost, communication and
storage overhead, while achieving mutual authentication, session
key agreement, device’s identity confidentiality, and resistance
against the following attacks: replay attack, man-in-the-middle
attack, impersonation attack, and modification attack.
Index Terms—Industrial IoT, M2M communications,
Lightweight Authentication, Security, Sensors.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technology is akey enabler for the next industrial revolution, known as
Industry 4.0 [1], [2]. The invention of the steam engine by
James Watt in the 18th century caused the first generation of
industrial production; the invention of electric power brought
about the second industrial revolution in 1870 with the
widespread use of electric machines in production lines [3]. The
industrial automation and widespread adoption of computers
and programmable logic controllers (PLC) in 1970s staged the
third industrial revolution. Nowadays, IIoT and Machine-to-
Machine (M2M) communications are about to bring the fourth
industrial revolution known as Industry 4.0 [4]–[6], where man,
machine, and product will be interconnected throughout the
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whole supply-chain from the production floor to the managerial
level. This will boost the productivity and allow customised
and flexible production while benefiting from the economies
of scale [7], [8].
However, the transition from the third industrial revolution
to Industry 4.0 raises a wide spectrum of new security issues
[3], [5], [9]–[11]. Traditional industrial communication systems
have been designed for reliable operation in a noisy factory
environment, employing mainly hard-wired propriety-based
communication technologies to connect sensors, actuators, and
controllers as well as other industrial components such as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA)
and Manufacturing Execution System (MES). Nevertheless,
with the emergence of IIoT, future factories will increasingly
rely on diverse communication technologies including wireless
standards to ensure connectivity, interoperability, and remote
operation and control of production processes through the
Internet. This provides an unprecedented attack surface for
the attackers. Unlike computer networks, where an attack
normally threatens the information integrity, confidentiality, or
availability, attacks against a smart factory can cause physical
damage, threaten the human life, render the quality or final
products by compromising the production processes, or lead
to increased use of resources [9]. Last but not least, unlike the
short lifetime of consumer electronics, the lifespan of machines
operating on a production floor normally lasts for several
decades, and it is not always economically viable to completely
replace the legacy equipment with the latest technology. Hence,
it is essential to come up with novel solutions that ensure
security not only for the leading-edge manufacturing technology
but also for the legacy systems.
Since authentication is the cornerstone of providing effective
security, a number of authentication schemes have been
proposed to ensure security in IoT or M2M applications [12]–
[16]; however, they cannot be readily applied for IIoT because
manufacturing machines are naturally limited with computation
power and/or communication bandwidth. In this paper, we
propose a lightweight authentication scheme to authenticate
these resource constrained machineries in order to ensure secure
integration of IIoT solutions in the future production systems.
To this end, we consider an IIoT scenario where a machine
(i.e., a smart sensor), equipped with a Secure Element (SE), is
authenticated by a network element (i.e., a router) equipped
with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the related work. Section III describes the proposed
authentication mechanism. Section IV presents the security
analysis for the proposed mechanism, and Section V discusses
its performance evaluation in terms of communication overhead,
computational cost, and storage cost. Finally, Section VI
concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
A. M2M Communication protocols for IIoT
The main focus of communication protocols is to guarantee
the delivery, routing and storage of the information without the
necessity of implementing different mechanisms in different
devices or applications. Based on relevant scientific works, we
evaluate the most popular protocols for use in IIoT and M2M
communication. As a result, according to [33] and [34] the
most discussed and promoted standards for the communication
between devices and cloud services are:
• 6LoWPAN: IPV6 over Low power Wireless Personal
Area Network
An Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) over low-power
wireless personal area networks (6LoWPAN) standard
has been developing, by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), in order to promote the development of
the IoT and exploit the M2M applications. 6LoWPAN
enables IP-based M2M devices to connect to the Internet.
More precisely, one potential application is to monitor
the manufacture process in industry [26], [27], where
a number of sensors, actuators, and controllers are
connected together to achieve passive monitoring and
active control and automation. However, 6LoWPAN
has various security challenges and many threats and
trust crises are existing along with its development.
Sensor nodes are usually distributed in an unprotected
environment and messages can be easily eavesdropped
in the transmission. A lot of research works have been
proposed to overcome the vulnerabilities of the 6LoWPAN
systems. A secure authentication and key establishment
scheme (SAKES) has been proposed in [17]. SAKES
makes use of two different cryptographic schemes.
Firstly, the authors propose the use of a symmetric
key scheme to encrypt messages in the authentication
phase and then, an asymmetric key scheme based on
the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is used, in the
key establishment phase, to build a session key between
the 6LoWPAN devices and the server. More precisely,
the session key in the SAKES scheme is calculated
based on the Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange method.
EAKES6Lo scheme proposed by Qiu et.al is a mutual
authentication and key establishment scheme for M2M
communication in 6LoWPAN Networks [18]. It consists
of three phases: pre-deployment phase, AKE phase,
and handover phase. Their security analysis shows that
the proposed scheme can be resistant against replay
attacks, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, impersonation attacks,
Sybil attacks, and compromised attacks. Moreover,
it can benefit from low computational overhead and
transmission overhead.
• MQTT: Message Queue Telemetry Transport
Message Queue Telemetry Transport, is an OASIS
standardized protocol [19]. It is designed to be lightweight,
flexible and simple to implement. MQTT uses different
routing mechanisms, such as: one-to-one; one-to-many or
many-to-many, making possible the connection for IoT
and M2M to connected devices/applications. MQTT is
a publish/subscribe messaging transport protocol on the
top of TCP/IP protocol consisting of three components
(subscriber, publisher, and broker). In terms of Quality
of Service (QoS), it supports three levels: (i) QoS-0:The
message will be delivered once, with no confirmation, (ii)
QoS-1: The message will be delivered at least once, with
confirmation required, (iii)QoS-2: The message will be
delivered exactly once by using a handshake. However,
although MQTT has been deployed for IoT, it has limited
security features addressing IoT security issues. In
particular, MQTT uses user-name/password authentication
and SSL/TLS for secure data communication [20]. Hence,
further efforts are required so that MQTT can address
effectively and efficiently security issues for IoT. In
[11], the authors have envisaged the use of SSL/TLS
with certificates and session key management to enhance
security for MQTT. In particular, they have proposed
a Secure MQTT (SMQTT). Their proposed solution is
based on lightweight Attribute Based Encryption (ABE)
[22], [23] over elliptic curves [35]. They have used
ABE because of its inherent design supporting broadcast
encryption that is suitable for IoT applications. ABE
includes two types: (i) Cipher-text Policy based ABE
(CP-ABE), and (ii) Key Policy based ABE (KPABE).
Authors’ analysis and performance evaluation show that
SMQTT is efficient, robust, and scalable.
• AMQP: Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
Advanced Message Queuing Protocol, is a binary
application layer protocol standardized from the ISO/IEC
19464. It is a message centric protocol on top of
TCP/IP, which provides publish-subscribe and point-to-
point communication. AMQP supports message-oriented
communication via message-delivery guarantees including:
(i) at-most-once, when each message is delivered once or
never, (ii) at-least- one, when each message is delivered
and (iii) exactly-one, when the message will certainly
delivered only once [24]. AMQP provides different
features, including routing and storing messages within
the broker using message queues. In terms of security, it
supports SASL authentication and TLS for secure data
communication [25].
• CoAP: Constrained Application Protocol
Constrained Application Protocol, is a web transfer
protocol which supports unicast and multicast requests
for use in constrained devices and networks. It is based
on a request-response architecture between endpoints.
CoAP clients after sending the requests using an URI,
can receive as a response GET, PUT, POST and DELETE
resources from the server [26]. The messages are
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF POSSIBLE M2M PROTOCOLS FOR IIOT
Protocol Feature Layer TCP/UDP Security Related work
6LOWPAN
To map services required by the IPv6 over
Low power WPANs to maintain an IPv6
network
Network TCP SSL [17], [18]
MQTT
To utilize the publish/subscribe pattern to
provide transition flexibility and simplicity
of implementation
Application TCP SSL [19]–[23]
AMQP To provide publish-subscribe and point-to-
point communication
Application TCP SSL [24], [25]
CoAP To connect resource-constrained devices in
a secure and reliable way
Application UDP DTLS [26]–[29]
XMPP
To transfer instant messaging (IM) standard
that is used for multi-party chatting, voice
and video calling and telepresence
Application TCP SSL [30], [31]
DSS
To enable scalable, real-time, dependable,
high-performance and interoperable data
exchanges using a publish–subscribe pattern
Application TCP/UDP SSL [32], [33]
exchanged over UDP between endpoints and also it
supports the use of unicast and multicast requests. In
terms of QoS, CoAP supports two levels: (i) ’confirmable’
when no packet is lost and the receiver respond with
an ACK; and (ii) ’non-confirmable’ when the message
do not require an ACK. CoAP provides security via the
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) which is a
secure protocol for network traffic to support handling
packet loss, reordering of messages and message size [27].
However, DTLS requires numerous message exchanges
to establish a secure session and thus it is characterized
by high communication cost. Therefore, CoAP suffers
from this challenge of DTLS. In order to overcome this
issue, a lightweight secure CoAP for the Internet of
Things (Lithe) scheme has been proposed by Raza et.al
[28]. Lithe scheme shows that DTLS can be compressed
and its overhead is significantly reduced. The proposed
scheme is implementated in Contiki [29] and their
evaluation shows significant gains in terms of packet size,
energy consumption, processing time, and network-wide
response times when compressed DTLS is enabled.
• XMPP: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol, is a TCP
communication protocol based on Extensible Markup
Language (XML) used for real-time messaging, online
presence and request-response services [30]. Clients
communicate via a distributed network and do not rely
on a central broker. XMPP supports publish/subscribe
model and provides security such as authentication via
SASL and secure communication via TLS but does not
provide any level of QoS [31].
• DDS: Data Distribution Service
Data Distribution Service (DDS) is one of the publish-
subscribe protocol for real-time M2M communications
which has been developed by Object Management Group
(OMG) [32]. In contrast to other publish-subscribe appli-
cation protocols like MQTT or AMQP, DDS relies on
a broker-less architecture and uses multicasting. These
facilities provide high reliability to its applications. Its
broker-less publish-subscribe architecture suits well to the
real-time constraints for IoT and M2M communications.
DDS defines a comprehensive set of QoS policies. These
provide control over dynamic discovery, content-aware
routing and filtering, fault tolerance and deterministic
real-time behavior [33].
B. TPM (Trusted Platform Module)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an international stan-
dard for secure cryptographic processors written by Trusted
Computing Group (TCG), documented as ISO/IEC 11889
standard. OPTIGATM TPM is a portfolio of security chips
(cryptocontroller), provided by Infineon Technologies AG, to
protect integrity and authenticity of embedded devices and sys-
tems, carry out remote attestation, and perform cryptographic
functions. It supports both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 standards
and provides a secure communication channel between smart
factories to protect data, processes, and intellectual property
against potential sabotage or theft. Its key features include
secured key, certificate, and password storage as well as
dedicated key management and support for a variety of
encryption algorithms [36], [37].
III. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
In this Section, we propose a lightweight authentication
mechanism for machine-to-machine communication between
a resource-constrained industrial device (e.g., smart sensor)
including a Secure Element (SE) and a router including a TPM.
The proposed mechanism is inspired by [38] and includes
two procedures: a) the registration procedure where the sensor
is registered to the Authentication Server (AS) and b) the
authentication procedure where mutual authentication between
the sensor and the router is achieved. The used notations in
the proposed mechanism are listed in Table II.
Fig. 1. Registration procedure.
TABLE II
NOTATIONS
Symbol Description
x A secret key protected by the AS
PSK A secure pre-shared key between the AS and the
router
IDi The identity of smart sensor i
AIDi The alias of entity i
fi Function generation
SKi The shared key between smart sensor i and a router
Ri A random number generated by a Pseudorandom
Number Generator (PRNG)
h(.) A one-way hash function
‖ A concatenation operator
⊕ XOR operation
A. Registration
Each smart sensor needs to perform the registration procedure
with the AS through a secure channel. The AS generates the
secure pre-shared key set PSKi , i = 1, ..., n and sends each
PSKi to one of the routers. The registration procedure consists
of the following steps, as it is shown in Figure 1.
1) Smart sensor → AS: The smart sensor transmits its
unique identity number IDi to the AS over a secure
channel.
2) Upon receiving the smart sensor’s ID, the AS calcu-
lates the following three secret authentication parame-
ters for the sensor: f1i = h(IDi ‖ x ), f2i = h(f1i), and
f3i = PSK ⊕ f1i . The objective of f1i , f2i is to build the
relation between sensor’s ID and AS.
3) AS → Smart sensor: The AS sends the following
parameters in the smart sensor via a secure channel:
f2i , f3i . These parameters are stored in the SE of the
sensor.
B. Authentication
After the registration phase, each sensor is able to authenti-
cate to a router. It is worthwhile to mention that, during the
authentication procedure, the sensor never uses its real identity
to authenticate to a router. Hence, the smart sensor’s ID cannot
be eavesdropped by a malicious entity. The authentication
procedure consists of the following steps, as it is shown in
Figure 2.
1) The smart sensor generates a random number R1 and
stores it in the SE of the sensor. Then, it computes
the parameter M1 as follows: M1 = h(f2i)⊕ R1 .
Afterwards, the sensor computes its alias as
AIDi = h(R1 )⊕ IDi and computes the parameter M2
as follows: M2 = h(R1 ‖ M1 ‖ AIDi).
2) Smart sensor → router: The smart sensor sends to
the router an authentication request (i.e., Message 3)
including (M1 ,M2 , f3i ,AIDi).
3) Upon receiving the authentication request, the
router performs the following. Firstly, the
router retrieves f1i by using the pre-shared key
PSK (i.e., f1i = f3i ⊕ PSK ). Then, the router
obtains R1 and IDi via R1 = M1 ⊕ h(f2i) and
IDi = AIDi ⊕ h(R1 ), respectively. Then, router checks
whether h(R1 ‖ M1 ‖ AIDi) is equal to M2 . The
authentication request is rejected if h(R1 ‖ M1 ‖ AIDi)
and M2 do not match. Next, the router generates
a random number R2 that is stored in the TPM of
the router. Then, it computes AIDj , M
′
1 , and M
′
2 as
follows: AIDj = R2 ⊕ h(IDi), M ′1 = f1i ⊕ h(IDi),
and M
′
2 = h(M
′
1 ‖ AIDj ‖ R2 ). Finally, the router
calculates the session key SKij as SKij = h(R1 ‖ R2 ).
4) Router → Smart sensor: The router sends back to the
sensor the authentication response (Message 4) including
M
′
1 , M
′
2 and AIDj .
Fig. 2. Authentication procedure.
5) The smart sensor retrieves R2 by computing
AIDj ⊕ h(IDi) and checks if h(R2 ‖ M ′1 ‖ AIDj ) and
M
′
2 are equal. If they are equal, the router calculates the
session key SKij as SKij = h(R1 ‖ R2 ). Finally, the
smart sensor calculates M
′ ′
1 as SKij ⊕ h(R2).
6) Smart sensor → Router:The smart sensor sends Message
5 including M
′ ′
1 to the router.
7) Upon receiving Message 5, the router uses its session
key SKij calculated in step 3 in order to retrieve h(R2).
Then, the router calculates SKij ⊕M ′ ′1 and compares
it with h(R2). If they are equal, it means that the smart
sensor holds the legitimate session key.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this Section, we provide the security analysis of the
proposed authentication mechanism. We have adopted the
security analysis approach followed in [39]–[41] and thus,
we have the following:
Proposition 1. Smart sensor’s identity confidentiality is pro-
vided by the proposed mechanism.
Proof. In the proposed mechanism, the confidentiality of the
smart sensor’s identity is based on a hash value of a random
number R1 and a XOR function (i.e., AIDi = h(R1 )⊕ IDi ).
Therefore, the adversary cannot derive the identity IDi of the
smart sensor without knowing the random number R1 .
Proposition 2. The proposed mechanism provides entity mutual
authentication.
Proof. In the authentication phase, mutual authentication
between the smart sensor and the router can be achieved
based on the received Message 3 and Message 4. Upon receipt
of M1 ,M2 , f3i , and AIDi , the router checks whether M2 is
equal to h(R1 ‖ M1 ‖ AIDi). The smart sensor is considered
authenticated if the equality holds. The same process takes
place in authenticating the router when the smart sensor
receives M
′
1 , M
′
2 and AIDj . The smart sensor computes
h(R2 ‖ M ′1 ‖ AIDj ) and checks whether this value is equal
to M
′
2 . If they are equal, the router is also considered as
authenticated. Moreover, if the adversary aims to forge a valid
smart sensor/router, he/she needs to generate valid messages.
However, the adversary cannot generate the valid messages
because he has no information about the random numbers (i.e.,
R1 and R2 ).
Proposition 3. The proposed mechanism is resistant to replay
attack.
Proof. As it is described in Subsection III-B, we assume that a
legitimate smart sensor has sent Message 3 (i.e., M1 ,M2 , f3i ,
and AIDi ) to the router. If an adversary tries to impersonate
the legitimate smart sensor by replaying Message 3, the router
will reject the authentication request because the alias AIDi
of the smart sensor is calculated based on a hash value of a
random number R1 which is only known to the legitimate
sensor.
Proposition 4. The proposed mechanism is resistant to man-
in-the-middle attack.
Proof. By obtaining the smart sensor’s identity (i.e., IDi ),
an adversary is not able to lunch a man-in-the-middle attack
and computes a session key SKij , because he/she is not able
to obtain the secret key x that is only known to the AS. x
is securely stored in the authentication server and is never
transmitted to any other entity. Meanwhile, the adversary cannot
pretend that is a trustful router to authenticate other smart
sensors since he/she does not have the pre-shared secret key
PSK .
Proposition 5. The proposed mechanism is resistant to imper-
sonation attack.
Proof. We consider that a smart sensor (e.g., smartsensork)
intends to impersonate another smart sensor (e.g.,
smartsensori). However, smartsensork cannot obtain
the session key SKij generated by the smartsensori and the
router because it has no information about the random number
of smartsensori.
Proposition 6. The proposed mechanism is resistant to modi-
fication attack.
Proof. The one-way hash function h() guarantees that informa-
tion cannot be modified without being detected. If an adversary
transmits a modified message to the router, the router will
detect it by checking the hash values.
TABLE III
SETTING OF PARAMETERS
Parameters Value (bits)
IDi 128
AIDi 128
Random number 128
Hash value 128
f1i 128
f2i 128
f3i 128
Moreover, the proposed authentication mechanism can
achieve the following security objectives:
1) No clock synchronization:
In the proposed mechanism, it is not required to synchro-
nize the clock of the devices (e.g., smart sensor, router,
and authentication server) because the messages which
are exchanged between the devices are similar to the
messages exchanged in the nonce-based authentication
mechanism [38] which does not rely on timestamps.
2) Fast error detection:
In the authentication procedure, the router will detect an
error immediately if an adversary uses the wrong sensor
ID. This means that a legitimate smart sensor will have
been identified by the router before the calculation of
session key.
3) Independent session key:
If the session key SKij is compromised by an adversary,
the smart sensor and the router can generate a new session
key. This is because the generation of the session key
SKij in the proposed authentication mechanism is based
on a hash function and random numbers and thus, it is
independent to the previous session key.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this Section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
authentication mechanism in terms of communication overhead,
computational cost, and storage overhead.
A. Communication overhead
To analyze the communication overhead, we assume that
the five messages (i.e., Message 1 , Message 2 , Message 3 ,
Message 4 , and Message 5 ) are transmitted during the registra-
tion procedure and the authentication procedure. More precisely,
Message 1 and Message 2 are transmitted in the registration
procedure and Message 3 , Message 4 , and Message 5 are
transmitted in the authentication procedure. Message 1 in-
cludes the sensor’s identity IDi and Message 2 includes f2i
and f3i . In addition, Message 3 includes M1 ,M2 , and AIDi
which are calculated as follows:
• | M1 |=| h(f2i)⊕ R1 |
• | M2 |=| h(R1 ) ‖ M1 ‖ AIDi |
• | AIDi |=| h(R1 )⊕ IDi |
Moreover, the parameters M
′
1 ,M
′
2 , and AIDj in Message 4 ,
are calculated as follows:
TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL COST OF OUR PROPOSED MECHANISM
Smart Sensor Router Authentication Server
Registration — — CXOR + 2 ∗ Ch
Authentication 4 ∗ CXOR + 7 ∗ Ch + Cran 6 ∗ CXOR + 7 ∗ Ch + Cran —
• | M ′1 |=| h(IDi)⊕ f1i |
• | M ′2 |=| h(R2 ‖ M
′
1 ‖ AIDj ) |
• | AIDj |=| h(IDi)⊕ R2 |
Finally, the parameter M
′′
1 in Message 5 , is calculated as
follows:
• | M ′′1 |=| SKij ⊕ h(R2 ) |
Table III contains the setting of parameters that we have
assumed for evaluating the communication overhead of the pro-
posed mechanism. Therefore, the overall bandwidth overhead
of the proposed mechanism is calculated as follows:
bw =
5∑
i=1
Message i (1)
• Message 1 =| IDi | = 128 bits
• Message 2 =| f2i | + | f3i | = 256 bits
• Message 3 =| M1 | + | M2 | + | f3i | + | AIDi |= 768
bits
• Message 4 =| M ′1 | + | M
′
2 | + | AIDj |= 640 bits
• Message 5 =| M ′′1 |= 128 bits
B. Computational cost
To calculate the computational cost of the proposed mecha-
nism, we have considered the following notations: Ch denotes
the cost of one-way hash function; CXOR denotes the cost
of XOR operation; and Cran denotes the cost of generating
a random number. Based on the three components (i.e, smart
sensor, router, and authentication server) which are used in
the proposed mechanism, the computational cost of each
component is presented as follows:
1) Smart Sensor
The smart sensor performs computations only in the
authentication procedure. Thus, the total computational
cost of this procedure is 4 ∗ CXOR + 7 ∗ Ch + Cran.
2) Router
The router performs computations only in the authen-
tication procedures. Therefore, it needs to perform
6 ∗ CXOR + 7 ∗ Ch + Cran operations.
3) Authentication Server
The authentication server performs CXOR + 2 ∗ Ch
operations to allow a smart sensor to be registered.
The proposed mechanism’s computational cost is illustrated
in Table IV. Due to the fact that the proposed authentication
mechanism is based only on XOR operation and hash operation
is efficient in terms of the computational cost.
C. Storage overhead
In the proposed mechanism, only a few parameters are
needed to be stored by the smart sensor, the router, and the
AS. The smart sensor stores its unique identity number IDi
and the following parameters: f2i , f3i , R1 , R2 , AIDi , AIDj ,
M1 , M2 , M
′
1 , M
′
2 , M
′′
1 , and SKij . In the other side, the router
stores the pre-shared key PSK and the following parameters:
f1i , f3i , R1 , R2 , IDi , AIDi , AIDj , M1 , M2 , M
′
1 , M
′
2 , M
′′
1 ,
and SKij .
Moreover, the AS stores f1i , f2i , f3i , and PSK . Following
the setting of parameters presented in Table III, the proposed
mechanism’s storage cost is illustrated in Table V.
TABLE V
STORAGE COST OF OUR PROPOSED MECHANISM
Smart Sensor Router Authentication Server
IDi X X —
AIDi X X —
AIDj X X —
R1 X X —
R2 X X —
M1 X X —
M2 X X —
M
′
1 X X —
M
′
2 X X —
M
′′
1 X X —
SKij X X —
f1i — X X
f2i X — X
f3i X X X
PSK — X X
Total cost (bits) 2176 2304 512
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight authentication
mechanism, based only on hash and XOR operations, for
M2M communications in Industrial IoT environment. The
proposed mechanism is characterized by low computational
cost, communication and storage overhead, while achieving
mutual authentication, session key agreement, device’s identity
confidentiality, and resistance against the following attacks:
replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, impersonation attack,
and modification attack. As future work, we plan to extend
the proposed authentication mechanism to provide lightweight
mutual authentication between sensors in Industrial IoT envi-
ronment.
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